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ABSTRACT  __________________________________________________________________________ 
In the modern theory of growth, monopoly plays a crucial role both as a cause and an effect of innovation. 
Innovative firms, it is argued, would have insufficient incentive to innovate should the prospect of 
monopoly power not be present. This theme of monopoly runs throughout the theory of growth, 
international trade, and industrial organization. We argue that monopoly is neither needed for, nor a 
necessary consequence of, innovation. In particular, intellectual property is not necessary for, and may 
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System. 1. Introduction 
  The modern literature on economic growth focuses on 
technological innovation, its determinants and its impediments, as the key 
for understanding long-run economic development. A large portion of the 
modern industrial organization literature focuses on technological 
innovation as the driving force behind the evolution of firms and 
industries. Applied and theoretical literature in the field of international 
trade conceives trade as mostly due to product differentiation springing 
from technological innovation and the introduction of new goods. In these 
and other fields of economic analysis, innovation is both cause and effect 
of monopoly power. Cause, as the innovative firm is assumed to gain, at 
least some temporary monopoly following the introduction of the new 
product; and effect, as entrepreneurs would not undertake the innovative 
effort absent the perspective of earning future monopoly profits. This two-
way link between innovation and monopoly power has become, since 
Schumpeter first advanced it in the late 1940s, a dominant doctrine in 
many fields of economic theory: monopoly profits are the necessary cause 
and the natural effect of innovative activity. A standardized model of 
technological innovation has become common currency among scholars 
working in most areas of economics; it is a model in which the innovation 
is the disembodied and non-rivalrous outcome of the initial investment by 
the entrepreneur. Because of the non-rivalrous nature of innovations this 
model predicts that, in the absence of legal enforcement of the monopoly 
power ascribed, via intellectual property, to the original creator, copies of 
the new product would be reproduced by everybody else at a negligible 
constant marginal cost, thereby leaving the innovator in the dust. Absent 
the monopoly that intellectual property creates, entrepreneurs would not 
bother to innovate. Hence, the key role played by intellectual property: no 
intellectual property, no innovation. 
The irony is that while the “monopolistic” approach to innovation 
is widely regarded as a theoretical necessity, there is little empirical  
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evidence to support the crucial underlying assumption of increasing 
returns to scale. The goal of this paper is to argue that the standard 
competitive model provides a more solid foundation for the study of 
growth and innovation, and that there is no theoretical need of postulating 
either increasing returns or monopoly power to understand the dynamics 
of innovation. One consequence of improving our understanding of how 
innovation takes place in a competitive environment is that it better 
enables us to focus on some fundamental weaknesses in standard 
arguments for intellectual property. In fact intellectual property may be 
damaging for innovation, growth, and overall social welfare; the 
monopoly profits generated by intellectual property have played, and still 
play, a much more secondary role than is commonly believed in 
determining the rate and pace of economic progress. 
Let us focus first on the issue of intellectual property. In the 
common parlance, “intellectual property” confounds two different rights. 
One is the “right of sale” given to producers of ideas. It consists of the 
right to sell the fruits of intellectual work, in whatever form they can be 
packaged, embodied, and transmitted. This is not controversial; software 
producers have the right to sell the software packages they make and 
distribute the same way that watchmakers have the right to sell the 
watches they make and distribute. The second right associated with the 
term “intellectual property” refers to the power of producers of ideas to 
control how their products are used. This second right is enforced by 
means of an ever increasing set of legal tools: patents, copyrights, non-
disclosure agreements, shrink-wrap agreements, and so forth. It is 
permitted only to selected groups of producers: to software designers but 
not to fashion designers, to producers of medicines but not (until very 
recently) to producers of financial securities, to writers of books but not to 
creators of culinary recipes, to software-makers but not to watchmakers. 
This ability to control downstream usage, and particularly to avoid 
competing with one’s own customers, provides favored producers of ideas 
with monopoly power. This we refer to as “intellectual monopoly,” and it  
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is this we wish to challenge as either necessary for innovation to take 
place, or socially desirable. 
  Conventional wisdom in industrial organization acknowledges that 
intellectual property in the second sense leads to undesirable legal 
"intellectual monopoly." However, it generally argues that this might be a 
good thing. In Kahn (1962), for example, we find the statement, “This 
issue is not one of principle but of practical social engineering: how much 
protection [...] of what kind is required and worth paying for.” This might 
seem uncontroversial – how much might include none at all, for example. 
Imagine, however, that such a statement referred to protection from 
international trade – such a statement would be controversial indeed, and 
we think it ought to be equally controversial in the case of intellectual 
goods. 
As we mentioned, there are several strands of the existing literature 
that argue in favor of intellectual monopoly. Lucas (1988) and Romer 
(1986) argue in a growth theory setting that there are unpriced “spillovers” 
from innovative ideas, so that innovators are not fully rewarded for their 
incremental contribution to aggregate productivity. One way out of the 
asserted spillover problem would be via a complicated set of taxes and 
subsidies; another is to allow for monopoly power and relative profits. 
Still in the context of growth theory, Aghion and Howitt (1992), 
Grossman and Helpman (1991), and Romer (1990) argue that new goods 
are brought about via a technology for which aggregate increasing returns 
are unavoidable; hence, monopoly power is necessary for innovations to 
take place. In industrial organization Gilbert and Shapiro (1990) and 
Gallini and Scotchmer (2002) examine the theory of optimal patents. The 
starting point of their analysis is to assume that there can be no innovation 
without patent protection. In the theory of international trade Krugman 
(1980), and others after him, have developed models in which trade is due 
not so much to comparative advantages but to the introduction of 
differentiated goods via an increasing returns technology. Again,  
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intellectual monopoly is a requirement for product differentiation, division 
of labor, and international trade to take place. 
The intuitive backbone of the conventional argument, common to all 
of the aforementioned theories, runs along the following lines. Information 
and ideas are a “public good” in the sense that, once an idea is discovered 
or a piece of information revealed, it can be appropriated and used by an 
unlimited number of people. In the terminology that has become popular 
since the work of Romer, ideas are non-rivalrous goods. Hence the 
externalities, or unpriced spillovers, from ideas. Alternatively, the 
presumption that new ideas have a public good nature means that there is a 
near-zero marginal cost of reproducing and distributing them, implying, if 
it is costly to produce the original idea, that there is increasing returns to 
scale in innovation. Conventionally, fixed cost plus marginal cost pricing 
with constant marginal cost (in this case zero) implies that a competitive 
firm must lose money. So without monopoly there will be no output of 
new ideas, and the conventional conclusion is that intellectual monopoly is 
necessary for the production of ideas and the creation of new goods. In the 
words of Schumpeter (1943), “If one wants to induce firms to undertake 
R&D one must accept the creation of monopolies as a necessary evil.” 
 
Notice the logical structure of the argument we have just 
summarized: the presence of monopoly power is a logical consequence of 
the nature of the technology through which innovations are generated. 
This technological assumption has both positive and normative 
implications. On the positive side, this theory argues that, to model and 
understand the process of technological change, competitive theory is 
useless: when you see an innovation taking place, look for the 
monopolistic feature supporting it. On the normative side, the same 
assumption implies that legal enforcement of intellectual monopoly is a 
necessary evil, without which we would not be able to harvest the fruits of 
intellectual creation; hence, the issue is one of how much intellectual 
monopoly we should have, that it must exist is granted. Before moving on  
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to the presentation of an alternative description of the technology for 
innovation we will spend a few lines considering the building blocks of 
the conventional argument. 
  Let us start with the idea of unpriced spillovers. While there are 
certainly informational spillovers as ideas move from person to person, it 
is hard to see why they should go unpriced. Little justification is ordinarily 
given for this assumption, but the most likely culprit would seem to be 
employees moving from firm to firm. However, as Gary Becker (1971) 
astutely observed, “Firms introducing innovations are alleged to be forced 
to share their knowledge with competitors through the bidding away of 
employees who are privy to their secrets. This may well be a common 
practice, but if employees benefit from access to salable information about 
secrets, they would be willing to work more cheaply than otherwise.” 
Plenty of supporting evidence notwithstanding, from apprentices’ wages 
to the practice of pricing the academic quality of a department into the 
salary of new assistant professors, Becker’s observation seems to have 
gone unnoticed. The same goes for an even earlier observation made by 
George Stigler, according to whom, “There can be rewards – and great 
ones – to the successful competitive innovator. For example, the mail-
order business was an innovation that had a vast effect upon retailing in 
rural and small urban communities in the United States. The innovators, I 
suppose, were Aaron Montgomery Ward, who opened the first general 
merchandise establishment in 1872, and Richard Sears, who entered the 
industry fourteen years later. Sears soon lifted his company to a dominant 
position by his magnificent merchandising talents, and he obtained a 
modest fortune, and his partner Rosenwald an immodest one. At no time 
were there any conventional monopolistic practices, and at all times there 
were rivals within the industry and other industries making near-perfect 
substitutes (e.g. department stores, local merchants), so the price fixing-
power of the large companies was very small” (Stigler (1956)). 
In more recent times, there have been some authors, such as 
Leibowitz (1985), who did recognize that spillovers are generally priced,  
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but for the most part this assumption has gone unchallenged. The idea of 
unpriced spillovers seems to be justified largely by the notion of 
agglomeration – that often similar firms locate near each other to take 
advantage of these positive externalities. But notice that this would be the 
case even if spillovers were priced, provided that transactions costs are 
lowered by locating nearby. Certainly, evidence supporting the idea that 
large and unpriced spillovers take place among innovating firms is scarce 
at best – Ellison and Glaeser (1999), who provide the strongest case for 
such an assumption, find at best very weak evidence that agglomeration is 
due to spillovers. Most studies find even weaker or no evidence for the 
allegedly pervasive unpriced spillovers. Acemoglu and Angrist (2000), for 
example, estimate average-schooling externalities at the U.S. state-level 
and find no evidence for significant externalities.  Ciccone and Peri (2002) 
examine local labor markets to test if productivity increases with the 
average human capital of the workforce in the area where firms are 
located; the data reject this hypothesis. Most anecdotal evidence about 
industrial agglomeration, from Silicon Valley to the greenhouses of 
Almeria, suggests that firms do price informational and technological 
spillovers into the wages of their employees. 
  All this evidence notwithstanding, the idea that unpriced spillovers 
from new ideas are large remains widely held. This is often justified by 
means of the apparently obvious “fact” that ideas are nonrivalrous. This 
idea stems from a basic confusion about the economic value of ideas. 
Ideas, in their abstract form, are certainly nonrivalrous – unfortunately in 
their abstract form ideas also have no economic value. I can use any 
mathematical or physical theorem without minimally affecting the ability 
of other people to use the same theorem. But, and here is the catch, in 
order for me to be able to use such a theorem, it is not enough that the 
theorem exists in some abstract form – I must have acquired actual 
knowledge of the theorem. From an economic perspective, it is not 
abstract ideas that count, but rather copies of ideas embodied in either 
human or physical capital. My copy of the fundamental theorem of  
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calculus as embodied in my knowledge and understanding of calculus is a 
distinct economic entity from your copy, leading a separate economic 
existence. It is a different economic commodity in the obvious sense that 
if you were to die, taking your copy of  the fundamental theorem of 
calculus with you, it would in no way limit my ability to make use of my 
copy of the fundamental theorem of calculus. “Ideas” are non-rivalrous in 
the same sense that my drinking from my cup of coffee has no effect on 
your ability to drink from your cup. And I can even less take advantage of 
your copy of your idea without your permission than I can drink from your 
cup of coffee without your permission. 
This latter point – that I cannot access your copy of an idea without 
your permission – is important, because it is closely connected to the 
fallacy that ideas somehow are communicated automatically and 
costlessly. To use the fundamental theorem of calculus I must spend 
resources to learn it, the same way that to use any productive skill one 
must spend resources to acquire it, and the same way that to use any 
capital good one must purchase it. While abstract ideas may be 
nonrivalrous and disembodied, productive ideas are always embodied in 
either people or objects, and are as rivalrous as any other capital good. In 
fact productive ideas are, as even accountants have managed to recognize, 
parts and pieces of the capital stock of a society; their acquisition costs 
resources, and their reproduction and transmission cost resources. People 
owning a productive idea can earn income by teaching it, or by selling the 
objects in which it is embodied, or any combination of the two. The fact 
that in some cases the cost of transmitting an idea may be just a fraction of 
what it took to discover it is a feature of the technology of innovation 
which should be appropriately modeled but which, in any case, cannot 
justify the extreme assumption that transmission of ideas is costless and 
productive ideas are nonrivalrous goods. 
  The theory of innovation we present and discuss here is grounded 
on these elementary observations. Insofar as new commodities differ from 
other commodities, it is neither on account of the fact that they are non- 
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rivalrous public goods, nor because they generate positive externalities in 
the form of unpriced spillovers. So there is certainly no necessary role for 
monopoly in the theory or practice of innovation. New commodities differ 
from other commodities because their introduction requires someone to 
develop a “prototype,” which may be costly and indivisible, and because 
there are, as long as the adjective “new” is applicable, few people capable 
of producing them. Productive capacity for a new commodity is therefore 
severely limited relative to that for an “old” commodity, and the cost of 
acquiring such productive capacity may often be quite high. The standard 
competitive model, when commodities and technologies are carefully 
defined, provides a useful and accurate description of this situation. It 
leads to a dynamic model of innovation and adoption, which in many 
fundamental respects is orthogonal to the conventional one. In the 
extreme, intellectual monopoly is not only superfluous for, but also 
damaging to, technological progress and social welfare; competition and 
imitation are, instead, good for technological progress and social welfare. 
This change of perspective about the nature and the causes of economic 
innovations has far-reaching implications for industrial organization, 
growth theory, and the theory of international trade. After summarizing a 
simple but formal representation of competitive innovation, we will 
discuss some of the consequences. 
  There is another dimension of the public policy debate over 
intellectual property that needs to be highlighted. The traditional view not 
only overstates the need for intellectual property – it obscures the fact that 
government grants of monopoly encourage socially costly rent-seeking 
behavior. Most industrial organization and law and economics literature 
concerned with optimal patent rules seems to forget that there is a very 
strong downside to government provision of legal monopolies. Although 
generally recognized outside the arena of intellectual monopoly, little 
attention is paid to the problem of rent-seeking in the context of 
innovation. Yet while evidence of unpriced spillovers and increasing  
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returns is weak, evidence of rent-seeking is strong and dramatic. Some 
recent examples suffice to make the point. 
♦  The Sonny Bono copyright extension increased the length of copyright 
by 20 years retroactively; economists widely agree that the retroactive 
part of the extension serves no possible economic purpose.  
♦  The Digital Millennium Copyright Act, illegalizing a variety of 
activities because they might have an impact on copyright holders, has 
been widely documented to have had a stifling effect on certain types 
of academic research and on free speech. 
♦  Efforts are currently under way to legally mandate computer hardware 
in order to reduce copying. There is a possibility for substantial 
economic harm from legislation of this type because the computer 
industry, which is to bear the costs, is roughly an order of magnitude 
greater in size than the media industry that is the beneficiary.  
♦  There is a long tradition of using the patent system as a rent-seeking 
device. This is the case, for example, with submarine patents, which 
are filed, but intentionally delayed by many years through the filing of 
constant amendments. Because the patent is never granted, it is never 
made public, and the date at which the patent expires is determined by 
the time at which the “submarine surfaces.” This allows holding a 
claim to an idea that is currently useless, but might have some use in 
the future. Keep everything secret until someone else actually 
innovates and (usually at some substantial expense) develops the idea 
into something practical. After a nice business has developed the 
submarine surfaces, and demands royalties from the unsuspecting 
innovator. Obviously these activities contribute nothing to social 
welfare, but do detract from the incentive to innovate – who knows 
what submarines are lurking nearby? A very recent case in point is the 
effort by SCO to claim royalties for the free software system Linux, 
based on extremely weak legal claims.  
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2. Ordinary Economics of Scarcity 
  To understand where conventional reasoning about innovation 
goes astray, it is useful to discuss a simple example. For the sake of 
discussion, let us consider the creation of a new drug. We suppose 
(arbitrarily, but not ridiculously) that this drug takes a team of twelve 
expert biomedical researchers one year to invent. At the end of this year 
the team of twelve biomedical researchers is capable of producing the 
drug using tools and ingredients currently available on the market. The 
key point is that at the end of the year the knowledge is embodied in the 
researchers (and possibly some of the writing, machines, and materials 
generated by the R&D process they just completed) – no one can produce 
the drug unless the researchers tell them how to do it. For the new drug to 
be produced the team of researchers and their writings, machines, and 
materials are the stock of capital in which all useful knowledge is 
embodied – so far there is no unpriced spillover here. 
   Next we observe that it may be socially valuable to have other 
people know how to produce the drug, that is, to have more productive 
capacity of a useful commodity, rather than less. This is certainly the case 
whenever at full utilization of available capacity, the marginal utility of 
the last unit is higher than the marginal cost of producing it. For example, 
if a second team of twelve biomedical researchers knew how to produce 
the drug, they could set up a production line in Europe, while the original 
team was setting up production in the U.S., thereby satisfying the demand 
of many more people. As mentioned in the introduction, and despite the 
existing patent and copyright literature, it is a fact of life that transferring 
knowledge is a costly endeavor. How long would it take the biomedical 
team to explain to a group of inexpert economists how to produce the new 
drug? Given the huge literature on technology transfer, there is no mystery 
in the fact that it is costly to transfer productive knowledge. The mystery 
is: why do conventional economic theories of innovation ignore this fact? 
  If the second team is to learn how to make the new drug, there are 
two methods they can use to do it. First, they can “reinvent the wheel” by  
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simply replicating the efforts of the first team, spending a year doing 
research and obtaining the same stock of knowledge. Second, the first 
team can teach the second team how to do it. For the sake of concreteness, 
let us say that it takes one month to do it the second way (one month of 
team time for each of the two teams). The key observation is that the 
second method does not always dominate the first; the ranking depends on 
the relative price of the drug, the degree of impatience of consumers, and 
the opportunity cost of the biomedical researchers. The first method 
maximizes team time (two years to have two fully trained teams), but 
minimizes time until production can start (one year). The second method 
minimizes team time (one year and two months), but maximizes time until 
production can start (one year and one month). While team time has social 
value – so does beginning production one month earlier. Because 
beginning production one month earlier has social value, this immediately 
implies that the first team can sell its knowledge into a competitive market 
at a positive price, and not, as in the conventional story, at a price of zero. 
In fact, if it is socially optimal for the second team to produce the idea in 
parallel, then, since the first team can always recover the marginal social 
value of its knowledge, this price will necessarily cover the opportunity 
cost of having produced the knowledge in the first place. No government 
grants of monopoly are required to produce innovation in cases where it is 
socially optimal to have the initial knowledge produced by more than one 
team. 
We now want to examine in greater detail what went wrong in the 
conventional story.  If we consider the problem of building a shoe factory, 
we also face a constant marginal cost of producing shoes after the factory 
is built. Why is this not an issue? How can the fixed cost of the factory be 
covered? The answer is that shoe factories have a capacity constraint – if 
demand exceeds capacity then price will be above marginal cost, leading 




In competitive equilibrium, of course, it will turn out that these rents 
exactly pay for building the shoe factory.  Can we say in the case of ideas, 
as in the case of the shoe factory, that capacity is always chosen small 
enough that the competitive rent covers the cost of creation? In general, 
we cannot. With ideas the problem of indivisibility (or of minimum size) 
is significant. Indivisibility has some implications similar to that of fixed 
cost, but differs in important ways. In the example, there is no guarantee 
that the positive return is sufficient to compensate the research team for its 
time. It may be that the team would have to produce ¾ of an idea to be 
able to recover costs (better: that the productive capacity of a team of just 
nine researchers would be able to recover costs) – but this is not feasible 
because of indivisibility. This case is similar to the conventional story, and 
a legal monopoly on the new drug may be one way out of trouble. On the 
other hand, the social optimum might be such that saving a month in the 






















case, as we noted, the costs of the first team are necessarily covered by the 
competitive rent.  
Which case would arise in practice will depend on the specific 
circumstances. While the traditional model predicts that monopoly power 
is  always necessary for innovations to take place, the theory we are 
advancing does not claim that competitive rents are always enough to 
cover the discovery cost. In certain circumstances, when the initial 
indivisibility is particularly large relative to the demand for the new good, 
competitive arrangements would not do. But in most others, they will. The 
issue is therefore empirical, not one of principle. So that this does not 
seem a futile twisting of economic principles, a fact from Arnold Plant 
(1934): "During the nineteenth century anyone was free in the United 
States to reprint a foreign publication, and yet American publishers found 
it profitable to make arrangements with English authors. Evidence before 
the 1876-8 Commission shows that English authors sometimes received 
more from the sale of their books by American publishers, where they had 
no copyright, than from their royalties in [England]" where they did have 
copyright.  
Our theory is consistent with facts such as this – highly innovative 
industries exist in which the law does not grant monopoly power to the 
innovator. This is an enormous puzzle for the standard theory. The 
existence of such “competitive innovation” directly contradicts 
conventional wisdom; from all kinds of design to investment banking, 
from advertising to civil engineering, to agricultural innovations (until the 
1970s), competitive innovation is much more common than monopolistic 
innovation. Standard theory cannot explain this fact; our theory can, while 
at the same time accounting for the existence of monopolistic innovators. 
3. One-Shot Innovation Under Competition 
Ultimately, to understand whether an innovation will take place or 
not in a competitive environment, we must understand how much the new 
good/process is worth after it is created. To do this, one needs at least a  
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formal model for the equilibrium of a competitive industry after an 
innovation is introduced, to which we now move. General equilibrium and 
dynamic considerations will be introduced in the following section. 
In this economy individuals live forever. There are many 
consumers, indexed by  0 c > . In each period, consumers either consume 
one unit of the good, or not. The benefit to consumer c  of consuming a 
unit of the good is c ψ − , with  0 ψ > . In other words, consumers are 
ordered by how they value the consumption flow of this good: consumers 
for whom c  is small value it highly. Consumers also prefer to consume 
early rather than later: a unit of good consumed today is worth  1 δ <  of a 
unit of the same good consumed next period. In any period in which the 
good is not consumed, consumer c  receives a payoff equal to zero, 
independently of how much he/she likes consumption.  
Initially, there is a single prototype of the new commodity that 
generates the flow of consumption service. The inventor or producer owns 
this prototype. For concreteness, assume this is a durable good. Once sold, 
no downstream licensing or other kinds of monopolistic restrictions are 
possible. At each moment of time the prototype can either be used to 
generate a flow of consumption or reproduced. To make things less 
abstract, let us imagine the new good is a fresh recording of a new musical 
piece that is embodied in an MP3 file. Each copy takes one period to 
produce, and each MP3 that is copied produces  1 β >  additional MP3's in 
that period. Our interpretation of a technology such as Napster or Audio 
Gnome is that it increases β , that is, it increases the number of MP3's that 
can be distributed (reproduced) to different consumers from a single 
master copy in a single time period. Note that there are two possibilities 
for the reproduction technology. With most goods, we assume that they 
are not simultaneously consumed and produced. This means that each 
consumer would face the decision of how much time to allocate listening 
to the MP3, and how much time reproducing it. However, at least in the 
case of MP3’s, it may well be that it is possible to listen and copy at the 
same time. Since this 24/7 model of Quah [2002] is more favorable to  
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intellectual monopoly, as it makes copying less costly, we will adopt the 
24/7 assumption that simultaneous copying and listening is possible. 
Under competitive conditions, in the t -th period each MP3 sells 
for a single market price  t q .  MP3’s may also be rented for a single period 
for a rental rate  t r . Notice that consumers for whom  t cr ψ − >  value the 
song more highly than the rental cost, and will choose to listen to an MP3 
that period; consumers for whom  t cr ψ − <  will choose not to listen to the 
MP3: if they have a copy, they prefer renting out their copy to someone 
else to listening to it themselves. Notice how in a competitive 
environment, everyone is potentially a buyer and a seller. We are 
interested in three primary questions. Is the price of the very first copy 
ever different from zero in such an environment? If it were, would it be 
enough to compensate the producer for its sunk cost? Finally, does the 
price of the first copy increase or decrease when new technologies 
increase  β ? Recall that, according to the standard model of innovation, 
the answers are, respectively, “no,” “no,” and “decreases.” We will show 
that, in our theory, the answers are “yes,” “it depends,” and “increases.”  
According to standard competitive theory the sale price of an MP3 
is just the present value of the rental rates. Since the rental rate is 
determined by the marginal consumer, it is  '( ) tt ru c =  where  t c  is the 
number of MP3s consumed in period t . Note that since simultaneous 
consumption and production is allowed, production accumulates MP3s at 
a constant rate of β  per period, and there was only one MP3 in period 
zero, the number of MP3s in period t  is  t β . Hence, the price of MP3s at 
time τ  is 
  '( )
t tt
t qu τ τδβ β
∞
= = ∑ . 
In particular,  0 q  is always a positive number. For finite values of β  
satisfying an obvious upper bound, it is also a finite number. Since  0 q  is 
what the producer can earn from the first sale when he has no downstream 
protection at all (in practice he should be able to do better than this), there 
is money to be made for producers of intellectual products.   
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Is this competitive value of intellectual products enough to 
motivate the producers to spend the effort and time required? We do not 
know. To answer this question one needs to know the particular 
opportunity cost of time of the particular creator, which clearly varies 
from case to case.  
We also want to understand the social impact of a technology 
which facilitates the reproduction of “idea-goods.” Does it increase or 
decrease the value of intellectual products in a competitive market? 
Basically, received wisdom argues that cheap copying makes it impossible 
for innovators to earn back their production costs. If, in a competitive 
setting, increasing β  lowered  0 q  received wisdom would be correct – 
without downstream protection, less “idea-goods” would be created as a 
result of the advent of the new technology. What does happen to  0 q  as the 
parameter  β  grows larger? The answer depends on ψ . If  1 ψ <  demand 
is elastic. This is the empirically interesting case, at least when thinking at 
the early stages in the life-cycle of a new product. As β  grows larger, it is 
easy to check from the equation above that the price of the very first unit, 
the one from which the innovator receives his payoff, increases. For the 
particular functional form we adopted  0 q actually goes to infinity as β  
approaches a finite value. Notice that, in all cases, the rate at which the 
price falls over time is proportional to β . Nevertheless with elastic 
demand and large β , the dramatic increase in the rate with which price 
falls over time is associated with a higher initial price and greater rent for 
the innovator. 
In summary, under competition and in the empirically interesting 
case where demand is elastic, improving the technology for reproduction 
increases the first sale price. Contrary to assertions based on standard 
theory, careful inspection shows that the improved technology makes it 
much easier for a producer to recover sunk costs in a competitive market. 
This does not mean that the producer will argue against downstream 
licensing and in favor of increased competition: she will still be able to 
earn more revenue with a monopoly than under competition. But it is a  
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good argument for not giving in to the producer and granting them the 
monopoly: the social benefit of the monopoly (the ability to cover sunk 
costs and produce a socially desirable good) is reduced by the new 
technology. Indeed, in the case of music, the same computer technology 
that is increasing β  with ambiguous consequences for  0 q  is at the same 
time lowering the size of the indivisibility. The capabilities of a music 
studio that would have cost tens of millions of dollars several decades ago 
are now available using laptop computers and specialized software for 
thousands of dollars. 
This establishes competitive markets as a viable institutional 
setting for fostering innovative activity.  We move now to consider the 
general equilibrium implications of this approach in a growth theory 
context. 
4. Competitive Innovation and Growth Theory 
  In this section we embed our theory of competitive innovation in a 
dynamic general equilibrium context. The main implications of our 
approach for growth theory and general equilibrium dynamics are well 
illustrated by an example of sequential innovation in which – despite the 
presence of an aggregate indivisibility – the patent system is strictly Pareto 
dominated by the absence of any intellectual monopoly. As a second 
implication of the theory of innovation under competition, we examine 
how the trade-off between introduction of new machines and 
accumulation of old machines leads both to cycles in innovation and a 
fully endogenous rate of growth. 
4.1 Innovation and Welfare Theorems  
  We consider an economy in which an infinite number of different 
capital goods, indexed by  0,1,2,... i = , can be introduced sequentially, 
with capital good ibeing a pre-condition for the introduction of capital 
good  1 i+ . The stock of capital of quality i is denoted by  i k . Quality i 
capital may be used for several purposes. It may be used to produce () i γ  
units of consumption,  1 γ > , it may reproduce  1 β >  units of itself, or it  
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can be used to produce ρβ <  units of the next quality capital  1 i + . We 
call these three alternative uses the γ , β , and ρ  technology, respectively. 
Capital used in the γ  technology depreciates at a rate ζ ; capital used in 
the   and  βρ  technologies depreciates completely. Central to the idea of 
innovation is that there should be an indivisibility in the creation of new 
ideas, so we assume that the ρ technology is subject to an aggregate 
indivisibility of  0 k > ; if less type i capital than k  is used, then no 
output of the new capital good  1 i+  results. An amount  0 k > of capital 
good  0 i =  is already available in period  0 t = .  
  When capital is allocated in a feasible way among the three 
production technologies 
, , , i iii
t ttt k kkk
γ β ρ ≥++, output is given by 
  , , ii




tt t kk k
γ β βζ + =+ −  
and  
1, , 1
11 , for  ;   0 otherwise. ii i i
tt tt kkk k k ρρ ρ ++
++ = ≥ =  
We also assume that technological change is socially desirable, so that 
ργ β > , and that growth is both feasible and desirable, so that  1 δβ > . 
This means, absent the indivisibility, that only the ρ technology would be 
used, never the β . 
Denote with  0 t p ≥  and  0
i
t q ≥ , respectively, the period zero 
present-value price of a unit of consumption and of a unit of capital of 
type  i, available in period  0 t ≥ ; we use consumption in period  0 t =  as 
the numeraire. We are interested in the competitive equilibrium of such an 
economy, under the assumption that a complete sequence of markets is 
available at  0 t =  for trade in all the dated commodities  0, 0 {} , {} i
tt ti t ck ∞∞
== . 
  There is a representative consumer, endowed with k units of 
0
0 k at 
0 t = , and nothing after it. The period utility function  () t uc  is strictly 
increasing, concave, and bounded below. The discount factor is 
01 δ ≤ < . We assume that the feasible present value of utility  
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This is very standard, so we will not indulge discussing its properties. 
  Consider our economy at any point in time other than  0 t = . 
Denote with 
0 ( ,..., ,..., )
i t
t tt t x kkk =  the vector of available capital stocks. 
Note that, at time t, no quality of capital it >  can possibly have been 
introduced. Consider the maximization problem of a firm purchasing an 
input vector  t x  in the current period and planning to sell its output vector 
1 t y +  in period   1 t + . Depending upon which of the (3 ) t ×  activities is 
being used, the output vector may consist of any feasible combination of 
1 t c +  and 
0 1
1 11 1 ( ,..., ,..., , )
it t
ttt t kkk k
+
+++ + .  The aggregate technology set is a 
closed and convex cone, pointed at the origin but truncated along one 






+ . The size of the firm is therefore indeterminate, and we may as well 
assume that only one representative, price-taking firm is in place. In an 






+  dimension generates difficulties for the standard proof of existence of 
equilibrium, and for proving the second welfare theorem as well. While 
not insurmountable, addressing these technical aspects in the present 
context would take us too far astray from our main concern. We therefore 
proceed by temporarily adopting the simplification that  0 k = .
1 Setting 
0 k = eliminates the indivisibility constraint, fully restoring the convexity 
                                                 
1 The case in which the indivisibility is binding will be addressed later in this section. The 
reader should consult Boldrin and Levine [2003] if interested in a detailed treatment.  
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of the production cone. The problem of a firm operating in any of the three 
sectors  , ,and  βγ ρ  is then rather standard. Given  ,0 {,} i
tt it pq ∞
=  maximize 
period by period profits  t π . Profits are the difference between the present 
values of  1 t y +  and  t x . Given prices, firms compute their production plans 
0, 0 {} , {} i
tt ti t ck ∞∞
==  .  Notice that in our model the period-technology set  t Ω , 
which is composed of all the mutually compatible combinations of input 
and output pairs  1 (, ) tt x y + , is state-dependent, and may change from one 
period to the next. It does change whenever prices () ,
i







+++  in two adjacent periods make it profitable to use part of 
the stock of capital 
i






+  a period later. The 






++ ≥  holds. This is the formal 
requirement for a perfectly competitive innovation to take place.  
Given the pair  { }
0
0 0 (, ) t t qp
∞
=  let  0 ( ,..., ,...) t cc c =   be the unique 
sequence maximizing  () Uc. Define a competitive equilibrium for this 
economy as a collection of sequences 










   
for quantities, and  
  { } { } () 0 ,0 , i
tt t it pq
∞ ∞
= =   
for prices such that, given  
  { } { } () 0 ,0 , i
tt t it pq
∞ ∞
= = ,   the sequence { } () 0 t t c
∞
=   
 maximizes U ,  and the pair 










maximizes profits, with 
, ,, i iii
t ttt k kkk
γ β ρ ≥++ for all  0,1,... t = . Under 
constant returns and competition firms cannot make positive profits; 
hence, the sequence of equilibrium prices  { } { } 0 ,0 (, ) i
tt t it pq
∞ ∞
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with equality whenever the relative technology (γ ,  β , or ρ ) is used at a 
positive level. As  0 k =  and ργ β >  hold, it follows that, in equilibrium, 
it =  and a new kind of capital is introduced in each period. Hence, the 
equilibrium behavior of our simplified model is equivalent to one with an 
endogenous capital ladder or with an exogenous vintage capital structure. 
This competitive equilibrium is obviously a Pareto Optimum, so that the 
first welfare theorem is satisfied. The second welfare theorem is also 





( ) =    ( )
t t
t cc V kM a x u c δ ∞
=
∞






γ γ =  
, ,
1 (1 ) ,
i ii
tt t k kk







+ =  
and 
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0 ;   given
iiii
tt t t kk k k kk
γβρ ≥++ = , 
can be decentralized by prices  { } { } 0 ,0 (, ) i
tt t it pq
∞ ∞
= =  satisfying the 
conditions given earlier. 
4.2 Aggregate Indivisibilities and Patterns of Innovation 
Now we bring back the aggregate indivisibility  0 k >  and ask if 
this alters, and how, any of our previous results. It does, and along three 
directions. First, the Second Welfare theorem may fail: there exist optimal 
allocations that are not competitive equilibria, at least for the standard 
definition of competitive equilibrium adopted here. Second, the kind of 
competitive equilibrium we have defined earlier may fail to exist. Third, 
initial conditions matter, and may even affect the long-run rate of product 
innovation insofar as competitive equilibria differ from the simple 
vintage-capital-like pattern described above.  
The intuition for why the Second Welfare Theorem may fail is 
straightforward, and certainly familiar to students of general equilibrium 
with indivisibilities. Suppose that there is 100% depreciation, and that  
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() t Vk  denotes the social value function of the available stock of capital 
t k . Notice that, in general, this may be a vector listing all kinds of capital 














       
Then, when  1
1 0 k =  it is profitable to introduce type 1 capital at the 
prevailing competitive prices; notice that inequality (4.1) is a necessary 













    
it is unprofitable to have built the minimum quantity of type 1 capital at 
the competitive prices that prevail after it is built. Notice that this may or 
may not be true when it is socially beneficial to introduce type 1 capital. 
Hence, if it is socially beneficial to introduce type 1 capital and (4.1) and 
(4.2) simultaneously hold, the efficient allocation cannot be decentralized 
as a competitive equilibrium.  
In fact, these are exactly the same circumstances in which a 
competitive equilibrium may fail to exist. This is easy to see, as when no 
type 1 capital is introduced it is profitable to do so; but introducing type 1 
capital cannot be made consistent with competitive equilibrium, since 
doing it would involve negative profits. So this example is a failure of 
both the second welfare theorem, and existence of a competitive 
equilibrium. 
  Both lack of existence and failure of the second welfare theorem 
have the same causes: an indivisibility k  which is too large relative to the 
available stock of capital 
0
0 k , a vastly superior new technology (γρ β >> ), 
and a rapidly decreasing marginal utility of consumption. Under these 
circumstances, but only under these circumstances, perfectly competitive 
innovation systems fail to deliver the social optimum, and lack a  
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competitive equilibrium in the usual sense.
2 Under these same 
circumstances, but only under these circumstances, intellectual monopoly 
may support a socially better allocation than competition can achieve. 
Notice though that, for this to be the case, we must assume that the 
monopolist can install capacity equal to k  and then manage to produce 
strictly less than that, or price-discriminate among heterogeneous 
consumers. 
If we extend the notion of competitive equilibrium to allow the 
case in which (4.1) and (4.2) hold, but the new capital good is not 
produced while the old one is still accumulated, something nearly optimal 
may be implemented.
3 Roughly speaking, this corresponds to a path along 
which capital of type  1 i =  is not introduced right away, as requested by 
the social optimum, but a few periods later. How many periods later will 
depend on the size of β . When the economy grows sufficiently, the first 
innovation occurs and the economy switches to the new kind of capital via 
the  ρ  technology. As the length of time to innovation is a decreasing 
function of β , the welfare distance between the competitive equilibrium 
and the social optimum is smaller the higher is the value of β  in relation 
to ρ .  
This example also shows that initial conditions matter in the 
competitive theory of innovation, which is the third difference between the 
model with and without indivisibilities. Assume the allocation just 
described, in which innovation is postponed for a few periods until enough 
old capital is accumulated via the β  technology, is in fact a competitive 
equilibrium. Consider what may happen after the first innovation has 
taken place, say at time  1 τ > , and capital of type 1 has been introduced. 
Different “continuation paths” are possible, depending on the relative sizes 
of 
1 kτ , δρ , and k . If the latter is the same for all  0,1,... i = , as we assumed 
                                                 
2 Other, possibly more relevant, notions of competitive equilibrium may exist under such 
circumstances, which also implement the social optimum. 
3 This is closely related to the equilibrium concept used in Acemoglu and Zilibotti (1997) 
to study the role of diversification in innovation, and which is based on Hart (1979) and 
Makowski (1980). See Boldrin and Levine (2003) for a more careful discussion.  
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so far, and  1 δρ > , then it is obvious that, after the constraint represented 
by the low level of the initial stock of capital has been relaxed by the τ  
periods of β -driven accumulation, the indivisibility will no longer matter. 
In this simple case, initial conditions only affect equilibria during the first 
few periods, and accumulation paths become identical in the long run; a 
new capital good is introduced in each period and consumption grows at 
the socially optimal rate independently from initial conditions.  
Consider, although in passing, the case in which either the 
innovation technology is not very productive ( 1 δρ < ) so first best 
investment declines over time, or the indivisibility grows with the new 
kind of capital being introduced. In such circumstances a binding 
indivisibility is likely to come back and haunt the innovation process over 
and over again, no matter how high productive capacity has become. 
When this happens initial conditions matter also in the long run as they 
determine how many periods of β -driven accumulation are needed 
between one innovation and the next. Patterns of innovation are then 
cyclical, with the innovation’s phase followed by more or less long 
periods of steady accumulation of the same kind of capital stock to be 
interrupted by further bursts of innovation, and so on.  
Finally, we observe that these innovation cycles need not be driven 
by a physical indivisibility per se. There can be a similar cycle between 
capital widening and capital deepening when technological change is not 
neutral. Boldrin and Levine (2002) examine, without indivisibility, the 
case in which innovation is “factor saving” and is, therefore, intrinsically 
biased to reduce labor input per unit of output. While, in the simple 
indivisibility example above, both productivity and consumption grow 
faster during the innovation periods and nothing can be said about the 
employment level, in the factor saving model consumption grows slower 
or does not grow at all when a technological innovation is taking place, 
and employment decreases while productivity increases during that stage 
of the economic cycle.   
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Unlike the simple indivisibility example, the factor saving model 
generates movements in aggregate employment and productivity that are 
closer to observed one. In particular, a positive correlation emerges 
between the growth rates of total factor (or labor) productivity, 
employment, as well as a measures of investment in new capital. Many 
authors have called this the process of “creative destruction” and 
explained its appearance with a widespread presence of external effects 
and market power. However, it appears that competitive factor saving 
innovations – even without indivisibility – are sufficient for a reduction in 
employment (relative to trend) to generally accompany an increase in 
productivity (relative to trend). This casts doubts on recent claims that 
VAR estimates linking productivity growth to a reduction in employment 
constitute sufficient evidence for rejecting the idea that productivity 
shocks may account for a large portion of business cycle fluctuations. 
Contrary to such claims, the factor saving innovation model shows that the 
central prediction of a competitive model of endogenous innovation is, 
exactly, that above average productivity growth should come together 
below trend employment growth. 
Besides application to productivity growth, our framework has 
important implications for the past and future of intellectual property law. 
Generally speaking, capital accumulation reduces the significance of 
indivisibilities. Consequently, it reduces the need for intellectual 
monopoly. As we have shown, the larger are β  and ρ , the sooner the 
indivisibility becomes irrelevant, and innovations flow undeterred by 
competitive pricing. When technological change increases either β  or ρ , 
intellectual monopoly becomes more, not less, socially wasteful relative to 
competition. So, of course, do innovations that reduce the size of the 
indivisibility.  
The logic underlying competitive innovations in general 
equilibrium is essentially the same we exposed, in a partial equilibrium 
context, in the previous section. When initial productive capacity of the 
new good is small, competitive rents can be very large. As long as the  
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rents accruing to the innovator (better: innovators, as a continuum of 
identical households are acting here) are large enough to compensate for 
the opportunity cost of the 
ik γ  units of current consumption the 
innovation requires, competitive innovation takes place. When those rents 
cannot satisfy such a requirement, innovation is postponed for a number of 
periods. During such periods capital of the old kind is accumulated using 
the β  technology, until it reaches a stock so large that the opportunity cost 
of 
ik γ  units of foregone consumption is small enough to be paid for by 
the competitive rents. Our model not only explains how and why 
competitive innovations take place, but also how and why they sometime 
do not take place, and, finally, it explains how and why they follow 
irregular cyclical patterns.  
  Finally, the reader must have noticed that nothing argued so far 
















+ = , with  () , γ ⋅   ( ),  β ⋅ and  () ρ ⋅  
increasing and strictly concave functions, every single result would have 
gone through. In fact, when strictly concave production functions are 
adopted, the theory predicts that old kinds of capital are not immediately 
discarded every time a new and more productive one is adopted. They are, 
instead, slowly phased out as the stock of the new capital is progressively 
built up, as it appears to be the case in reality. 
4.3 The Social Cost of Intellectual Monopoly  
  In the absence of intellectual monopoly, we still expect that 
innovators will earn rents on their unique ideas. But, we have shown, in 
some circumstances this is no guarantee that the rent will be sufficient to 
cover the cost of innovating. However much an innovator can earn without 
a monopoly, surely an innovator can earn no less and perhaps sometimes 
more, with a government grant of monopoly. Surely, then, a patent or 
copyright system will result in more innovation than in its absence. Even 
granting the dubious proposition that government grants of monopoly 
have no social cost, this need not be the case. While each individual  
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innovator may have no less incentive to innovate with an intellectual 
monopoly, because each innovation will generally incorporate the 
innovations of earlier creators, the monopoly power of the latter will 
reduce the incentive to innovate faced by the former. Indeed, in the 
extreme case, there may be no innovation at all in the presence of 
intellectual monopoly. Our next goal is to develop this idea.  
Because innovations generally build on existing ideas, that is, on 
earlier innovations – it is generally recognized in the economics literature 
that intellectual monopoly has an undesirable effect on future innovation. 
This is central to Scotchmer (1991), for example. The fact that less 
innovation may result with intellectual monopoly than without is 
highlighted in Boldrin and Levine (1999), from which we adopt the 
following example. 
Consider the same technology and commodity space as in the 
previous section. To differentiate between monopoly and competition, we 
make the usual industrial organization assumption that demand is initially 
elastic, and eventually inelastic. More precisely we assume that for some 
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so that it is an elastic CES below  1 c = , and an inelastic CES above. This 
utility function is designed so that the global maximum of revenue  '( ) uc c  
takes place at  1 c = . 
  Finally, we assume that the economy is productive enough that, 
under competitive conditions, the indivisibility never binds. In the absence 
of intellectual monopoly, this implies that the first best and competitive 
equilibrium allocation has consumption and investment growing over time 
and that a new type of capital is introduced each period. Since investment 
is growing over time anyway, it follows that if k  is sufficiently small the 
constraint will not bind, and the competitive equilibrium remains the same  
 
28 
with or without indivisibility: repeated innovations take place because 
rents are high enough to provide an incentive for innovators to undertake 
innovative activity. 
Consider, for simplicity and by way of contrast, a patent system in 
which a complete monopoly is granted the patent holder forever. Suppose 
in fact, to simplify exposition, that the initial capital stock is  0
0 1 k =  and 
the monopolist starts with a unit of capital that does not depreciate. It can 
then produce a unit of consumption each period without any need for 
investment, as the whole stock is allocated to producing the consumption 
good, i.e. as 
,0
t k
γ , and remains fixed at one because of no depreciation. In 
other words, the innovator begins at the revenue maximum. This is 
monopoly heaven: the innovator simply sits tight and collects the money. 
Indeed, this is true more or less regardless of modeling details about 
timing, preferences, depreciation, and commitment about prices of future 
output. The only reason for innovation would be to achieve higher levels 
of output, and that would lower his profits, so the innovator never makes a 
second innovation. Not only that, but no one else can innovate without a 
license from the original innovator, so he prevents anyone else from 
innovating for the same reason. In contrast to the competitive equilibrium 
of thriving growth and innovation, here the patent system leads to the 
complete absence of innovation and total stagnation. 
This example may seem somewhat contrived, since it is the 
absence of depreciation that eliminates any incentive to innovate. If 
instead the depreciation rate is small and we still have  0 k = , there is 
aggregate stagnation as the innovator maintains the level of consumption 
at one, but there is constant innovation as new kinds of capital are 
introduced in order to replace old depreciated capital. In this case, there is 
no less innovation (but there is less welfare) under monopoly than under 
competition. However, this assumes that the indivisibility is not a 
problem. Suppose instead that the indivisibility matters, so that  0 k >  – 
then, for any fixed level of the indivisibility, if the depreciation rate is 
small enough, the monopolist will again choose not to innovate at all as in  
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the first example. The logic is, intuitively, the same one we explored in 
section 4.2 for the case in which the second welfare theorem was not 
satisfied. When the productive capacity to be replaced is small, because it 
depreciates slowly, there is no reason to pay the high cost associated with 
the indivisibility even if ργ β > ; one maximizes profits by replacing the 
small amount of depreciated capacity with old capital goods produced via 
the  β  technology. To anyone recalling the phone systems of the world 
during the great days of the telephone monopolies, this story must sound 
vaguely familiar. Finally, relax the patent system and allow the monopolist 
to control the β  but not the ρ  technology. Also in this case, in the 
presence of an indivisibility, the monopolist may be able to keep potential 
competitors out of the market. To achieve this, he simply needs to produce 
an amount 
0
t k  low enough to render the cost of the minimum plant size 
(
0
t qk) unprofitable for the potential innovator. Recall that the latter needs 
at least k  units of capital of type  0 i =  to introduce capital of type  1 i = , 
and that the market price 
0
t q  of type  0 i =  capital can be manipulated by 
the monopolist. 
In short, in this world patent protection leads to strictly less 
innovation, and an indivisibility in the production of new goods makes the 
problem worse, and is an argument against patents, rather than in their 
favor. 
4.4  Implications for International Trade Theory 
The standard model of innovation plays a crucial role also in many 
theories of international trade and, in particular, in theories aiming to 
connect technological progress to trade, and growth.  In the currently 
standard model of international commerce, trade takes place because 
monopolistic producers of intermediate capital goods (or of different 
varieties of consumption goods), who are scattered more or less randomly 
across countries depending on initial conditions, ship their products 
around to allow final output (or utility) to be produced in each country via 
a Dixit-Stiglitz production function (or utility function). The producers of  
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such goods are the innovators; they face an increasing returns technology 
exactly like the one we discussed, and criticized, in Sections 2 and 3. A 
particularly important feature of this model is that, as innovation increases 
the number of intermediate goods (varieties of consumption good) trade 
increases in step with output (utility). This feature yields two fundamental 
predictions, which appear to be consistent with empirical observations. 
The first, that trade in capital and intermediate goods becomes 
increasingly more important as innovations expand the number of 
available goods, and labor productivity grows. The second, that the growth 
rate of output, the division of labor, and market size are positively related. 
Are increasing returns to scale and monopoly power needed to 
explain these facts? Adam Smith predicted much the same thing, absent, 
however, any claims of monopoly power: 
 
“As the accumulation of stock must, in the nature of things, be 
previous to the division of labor, so labor can be more subdivided 
in proportion only as stock is previously more and more 
accumulated. … As the division of labor advances, therefore, in 
order to give constant employment to an equal number of 
workmen, an equal stock of provisions, and a greater stock of 
material and tools than what would have been necessary in a ruder 
state of things, must be accumulated beforehand. The quantity of 
industry, therefore, not only increases in every country with the 
increase of the stock which employs it, but in consequence of that 
increase, the same quantity of industry produces a much greater 
quantity of work” [Wealth of Nations, Book II, 3-4]. “The increase 
of demand, besides, though in the beginning it may sometimes 
raise the price of goods, never fails to lower it in the long run. It 
encourages production, and thereby increases the competition of 
the producers, who, in order to undersell one another, have 
recourse to new divisions of labor and new improvements of art,  
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which might never otherwise have been thought of” [Wealth of 
Nations, Book V.i.e, 26]. 
 
Consider in our framework, a world with two countries, A and B, 
two ladders  0,1,... i =  and  0,1,... j =  of capital goods, and two 
consumption goods, 
1 c  and 
2 c .  For each ladder, assume a set of 
production functions similar to those introduced in Section 4.1 . Let 
1 c  be 
producible via capital goods belonging to ladder  0,1,... i = , and 
2 c  be 
producible from capital good of ladder  0,1,... j =  . In each country, 
introduce a representative consumer with utility function 
   12
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tt t Uu c c δ
∞
= = ∑ ,  
and endowed with initial stocks  
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respectively. Consider first the two countries under autarky. Assume the 
indivisibilities 
i k  and 
j k  are large enough, relative to the initial 
endowments, to render socially undesirable, for each individual country, 
the introduction of new capital goods, either of ladder i or of ladder  j . 
Then both countries will use their β  technologies to increase the initial 
stock of capital of both types  0 i j ==. For many periods neither country 
innovates, therefore growing at a slower rate than otherwise desirable.  
Look next at the impact that opening up trade between the two 
countries may have on their rates of innovation adoption and productivity 
growth. Let the two countries be slightly asymmetric in their ability to 
innovate. To fix ideas, country A has a slight advantage in ladder i while 








>      (4.3) 
Opening trade has the immediate effect of pooling sectoral demands and, 
when the two capital goods are tradable, it leads also to a pooling of 
sectoral resources. Even when the two capital goods are not internationally  
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mobile, trade doubles the size of demand for each consumption good, 
facilitating the specialization of each country in the ladder in which it has 
a comparative advantage. The increase in demand induced by international 
trade reduces the chances that an inequality such as (4.2) holds, thereby 
weakening the indivisibility constraint and making it much more likely 
that 
1 i k
=  (respectively, 
1 j k
= ) is introduced in country A (respectively, 
country B) in period  1 t = . This increases welfare in both countries. The 
ideal situation is, obviously, the one in which not only consumption but 
also capital, from both ladders, is a tradable good. In this case the 
“demand pooling” effect is reinforced by a “resource pooling” effect. 










Either way, the indivisibility constraints are weakened and the length of 
time it takes to innovate reduced, thereby unambiguously increasing 
welfare in both countries. Further, after trade is allowed the allocation of 
production between the two countries is completely determined by 
comparative advantages, not by increasing returns. In this version of the 
model, in which comparative advantages are purely technological as 
defined in (4.3) above, the initial distribution of the two stocks of capital 
has no impact on the patterns of specialization. Introducing transportation 
costs for shipping capital from one country to another will make the 
patterns of specialization dependent upon initial conditions, rendering the 
model more versatile and interesting, without affecting the other main 
results. Trade allows comparative advantages to play their traditional role, 
and higher rates of productivity growth are related to larger trade flows.  
In summary, trade has three effects. It increases demand and, 
possibly, the amount of resources available, in country A and in country B 
to overcome the indivisibilities 
i k  and  
j k . It leads to an increase in 
specialization and in the international division of labor. Finally, it 
increases the growth rate of productivity and income in both countries. 




The theoretical idea of this paper – that intellectual monopoly can 
lead to less rather than more innovation while competition can lead to 
more, and more efficient, innovation – is well illustrated through the story 
of James Watt. In most histories, James Watt is a heroic inventor, 
responsible for the beginning of the industrial revolution. But an 
examination of the facts suggests otherwise – while Watt is certainly a 
clever inventor who managed to get one step ahead of the pack, he 
remained ahead not through superior innovation, but by clever exploitation 
of the legal system. The fact that his business partner was a wealthy man 
with strong connections in Parliament was not a minor help. 
Watt’s significant invention, of the steam condenser, occurred 
while he was working on an older Newcomen steam engine in 1764. He 
worked intensively for six months building a model. After a series of 
improvements, Watt attempted to patent the idea in 1768, spending about 
the same amount of time doing so that he originally spent building his first 
model engine. In 1775, supported by his business partner Boulton, Watt 
secured an Act of Parliament extending his 1769 patent until the year 
1800. Burke spoke eloquently in Parliament in the name of economic 
freedom and against the creation of unnecessary monopoly – but to no 
avail. Boulton’s connections in Parliament were too solid to be defeated 
by simple principles. In 1782, Watt secured a further patent apparently in 
an effort to preempt his rival Wasborough, who beat him to the invention 
of the crank motion. More dramatically, in 1781, when the superior and 
independently designed Hornblower machine was first produced, Boulton 
and Watt went after him with the full force of the legal system – 
bankrupting and ruining Jonathan Hornblower in the process. 
The effect of Watt on steam engine innovation is reflected in 
production. Prior to Watt, there were 130 steam engines in the U.K., 
mostly of the old Newcomen design. They were used primarily for 
pumping water out of mines. By 1800, when Watt’s patents expired, there 
were at most 1000 steam engines used in the U.K. of which only 321 were  
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the superior Boulton and Watt engines, with the remainder being the older 
Newcomen engines. Fifteen years later, it is estimated that 210,000 
horsepower is installed in England alone. It is only after the expiration of 
the Watt patents in 1800 that there is an explosion not only in the 
production of steam engines, but in steam engine innovation. New 
innovation in steam engines greatly increased the variety of applications, 
and in the next 30 years steam power finally came into its own as the 
driving force of the industrial revolution through the advent of the steam 
train, steamboat and steam jenny. Between 1800 and 1804 the most 
significant improvements, those of William Bull, Richard Trevithick, and 
Arthur Woolf, all become available, and it is difficult to avoid the 
conclusion that, observing Hornblower’s fate, they were simply waiting 
for the Watt patent to expire before releasing their inventions.   
Now despite the fact that there were many people working in 
parallel on steam engines, generally without protection of the legal system, 
and a great deal of overlapping and simultaneous discovery, it is possible 
that Watt’s contribution was so unique and the difficulty of discovery so 
great that it would not have happened without the promise of a long 
monopoly. (The facts of the Watt story suggest rather strongly that this 
was not the case.) But the fact is that Watt would have made a great deal 
of money even without the legal monopoly. This is strongly indicated by 
the impact that the expiration of his patents had on Watt’s empire. Despite 
the fact that many new firms sprang up, they produced an inferior engine, 
and Thompson [1847, p. 110] says that “Boulton and Watt for many years 
afterwards kept up their price and had increased orders.” 
In the end, the evidence suggests that Watt’s efforts to use the legal 
system to inhibit competition set back the industrial revolution by a 
decade or two. The granting of the 1769 and, especially, of the 1775 
patents likely delayed the mass adoption of the steam engine: innovation 
was stifled until his patents expired; and very few steam engines were 
built during the period of Watt’s legal monopoly. From the number of 
innovations that occurred immediately after the expiration of the patent, it  
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appears that Watt’s competitors simply waited until then before releasing 
their own innovations in an effort to avoid the fate of Hornblower. Also, 
we see that Watt’s inventive skills were badly allocated: we find him 
spending as much time engaging in legal action in an effort to establish 
and preserve a monopoly as he did in actual invention. Our theoretical 
contention, that innovation may be hurt rather than enhanced through legal 
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